יום רביעי, 21 באוגוסט 2013

לא בשמים? כן בשמים?
באחד הפסוקים המרכזיים בפרשת נצבים, נאמר על התורה (דברים ל, יב ):
"לֹא בַשָּׁמַיִם הִוא לֵאמֹר: 'מִי יַעֲלֶה לָּנוּ הַשָּׁמַיְמָה וְיִקָּחֶהָ לָּנוּ וְיַשְׁמִעֵנוּ אֹתָהּ וְנַעֲשֶׂנָּה'.
אנו רגילים לקרוא את חלקו הראשון של הפסוק בהקשר של דברי רבי יהושע (בבא מציעא נט, ע"ב) בסיפור על תנורו של עכנאי, ע"פ רבי ירמיה:
'לא בשמים היא.' - מאי (דברים ל') 'לא בשמים היא'? - אמר רבי ירמיה: שכבר ניתנה תורה מהר סיני, אין אנו משגיחין בבת קול, שכבר כתבת בהר סיני בתורה (שמות כ"ג) 'אחרי רבים להטת'.
לעומת זאת, רש"י מתייחס לפסוק כולו וכותב (בעקבות התלמוד במסכת עירובין נה, ע"א):
"שאילו היתה בשמים, היית צריך לעלות אחריה וללומדה".
קל לנו להבין את הכרזתו הדרמטית של רבי יהושע במסכת בבא מציעא ולהזדהות איתה, אך מה נעשה עם דברי רש"י, שגם הם מבוססים על מדרש חכמים?
ברמה הארצית והמעשית, לגבי קבלת החלטות הנוגעות לחיינו כבני אדם, אולי נכונה קריאתו של רבי יהושע; בית המדרש אינו יכוללהתנהל ע"פ בת קול או אותות שמימיים אחרים, אלא ההכרעות מתקבלות ברוב דעות אחרי דיון בין החברים בבית המדרש.
אך אולי דברי הגמרא במס' עירובין שאומצו ע"י רש"י מתייחסים לרובד נוסף:
לפעמים, כדי להגיע ל"אמת", צריך "לעלות לשמים", כלומר צריך להתעלות מעבר לשאלות של הכרעה, ולצאת למסע אל הלא נודע, לפתֵח לזמן מה תודעה טרנצנדטית.

האם יש להתייחס לאירועים בחיינו כאל תופעה מובנת, "טבעית" (=לא בשמים)? או שמא יש כאן תופעה "מן השמים", מעין בת קול המנסה לומר לנו משהו? ואולי בעצם ניתן להסתכל על לידה זו בשני האופנים; מדעית, ניתן להסביר איך קרה הדבר, אך האם יש לנו איזושהי דרך להבין למה הדבר קרה? כאשר עוסקים בלמה, אנו עשויים/עלולים להיגרר למחוזות שונים, בעיקר אם הסיבה האמיתית אינה ידועה.
מאז, מחשבותיי ורגשותיי נעות בשני צירים, לעתים מקבילים, ולעתים מתקיים גם מפגש ודיאלוג בין הצירים. תוך כדי כתיבה התחלתי לחשוב על המילה "ציר" ומובניה השונים; האם הצירים שמחשבותיי ורגשותיי נעו ביניהם כואבים? ואולי יש בשני המקרים מימד של יצירה, ולעתים בתהליך היצירה יש כאב. אולי גם כך ניתן להבין את המשמעויות של "משבר"; האישה 'יושבת על משבר' בלידה, ומשבר יכול בהחלט להוליד ולהצמיח.
שלהי אלול היא תקופה זו של רחמים, סליחות וחשבון נפש משמעותית מאד. מאידך – אך אולי לא מאידך בכלל – 
כבר שנים רבות אני מאמין שחשבון נפש אמיתי אינו צריך לעסוק ב"למה זה קרה לי", וזאת מכיוון שלרוב לא נוכל באמת לדעת, ואף אם היינו יכולים לדעת, "הכרה שכזו אינה מביאה טובה לבעליה, אלא מביאה צער וחרטה", כדברי עגנון (המלבוש), אלא אולי השאלה הנכונה יותר היא: "איזו משמעות אני יכול לתת למה שקרה לי ומה אני יכול ורוצה לעשות עם זה" ואולי מתחבר הדבר למחלוקת הידועה בין בית הלל ובית שמאי:
" שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים וּמֶחֱצָה נֶחְלְקוּ בֵית שַׁמַּאי וּבֵית הִלֵּל, הַלָּלוּ אוֹמְרִים, נוֹחַ לוֹ לָאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא נִבְרָא יוֹתֵר מִשֶּׁנִּבְרָא, וְהַלָּלוּ אוֹמְרִים, נוֹחַ לוֹ לָאָדָם שֶׁנִּבְרָא יוֹתֵר מִשֶּׁלֹּא נִבְרָא.
נִמְנוּ וְגָמְרוּ, נוֹחַ לוֹ לָאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא נִבְרָא יוֹתֵר מִשֶּׁנִּבְרָא, וְעַכְשָׁיו שֶׁנִּבְרָא - יְפַשְׁפֵּשׁ בְּמַעֲשָׂיו. וְאַמְרִי לַהּ, יְמַשְׁמֵשׁ בְּמַעֲשָׂיו."
לעתים קורים דברים שהיה עדיף לנו לולא היו קורים כפי שקרו, אך מכיוון שקרו, יש מקום להתבונן במשמעותם של דברים, "למשמש" מכוון לעתיד.
האם זה אומר שיש למחוק את העבר ולא להתייחס אליו?
ברור שלא; השאלה היא אם להפוך את החפירה "הארכיאולוגית" בעבר לעיסוק אובססיבי שלא יוביל לשום מקום ולא יקדם שום מטרה. העבר חשוב אך ורק בגלל השלכותיו על ההווה ועל העתיד ובמידה וברור שדבר לא רצוי אירע בגלל החלטה לא נכונה שקיבלנו, חשוב לנו להכיר בטעות, להודות בה ולקבל החלטות נכונות יותר בעתיד.
יאמרו לי: כל מה שקורה נובע ממשהו שעשינו או לא עשינו ואף יביאו פסוקים או מאמרי חז"ל התומכים בעמדה זו. בעיניי, עמדה זו נובעת מחוסר יכולתנו להכיל מצבים עמומים או מצבים בלתי מוסברים, ומכאן הצורך "להסביר" כל תופעה, כדי שלא נצטרך להתמודד עם עולם כאוטי.
אני מעדיף לראות במה שקורה אתגר הנועד (או המאפשר ) להפיק מאיתנו חלקים שאינם באים לידי ביטוי במצבים שגרתיים.
בסך הכל, בכל הרמות, אנחנו חיים בעולם בו יש לא מעט אי-וודאות והאתגר העומד בפנינו הוא איך מצד אחד להמשיך לתפקד ולעשות את מה שנכון לנו לעשות ויחד עם זאת, למצוא משמעות גם בעולם הבלתי מובן.

יום שישי, 16 באוגוסט 2013

אפילו העבריין הנידון למוות הוא אדם שנברא בצלם

לבני משפחתנו, חברותינו וחברינו היקרים'
פרשת "בן סורר ומורה"  נכתבה, לפי פרשנות חז"ל, לא כדי ליישם אותה, אלא היא בבחינת "דרוש וקבל שכר". העונש המוטל על אותו בן עבריין הוא סקילה.
בהמשך לפרשת בן סורר ומורה נאמר:
 דברים פרק כא 
(כב) וְכִי יִהְיֶה בְאִישׁ חֵטְא מִשְׁפַּט מָוֶת וְהוּמָת וְתָלִיתָ אֹתוֹ עַל עֵץ:
(כג) לֹא תָלִין נִבְלָתוֹ עַל הָעֵץ כִּי קָבוֹר תִּקְבְּרֶנּוּ בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא, כִּי קִלְלַת אֱלֹהִים תָּלוּי, וְלֹא תְטַמֵּא אֶת אַדְמָתְךָ אֲשֶׁר ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לְךָ נַחֲלָה.
גם אם לעתים יש תחושה שלאנשים מסוימים אין זכות לחיות, אין למזלנו אפשרות לבצע עונש מוות ע"פ ההלכה היהודית וגם במדינות נאורות.
יחד עם זאת, פרשה זו מזכירה לנו שאפילו העבריין הנידון למוות הוא עדיין אדם, שנברא "בצלם אלהים" ולכן אין להשפילו ללא גבול.
שבת שלום לכולכם
פנחס, ציפי ומשפחתם

-----



Dear Family and Friends,
The issue of the "rebellious son",  is considered by our Sages as a theoretical topic. As we know, the punishment inflicted to that delinquent son - even if apparently never applied - was "lapidation".
Immediately after this passage, we read:
When a man is legally sentenced to death and executed, you must then hang him on agallows.
However, you may not allow his body to remain on the gallows overnight, but you must bury it on the same daySince a person who has been hanged is a curse to God, you must not [let it] defile the land that God your Lord is giving you as a heritage.
Although sometimes we feel that some people shouldn't be alive, fortunately there is no death sentence in Jewish Law anymore.
Nevertheless, this passage probably reminds us that a human being, despite of being sentenced to death, always remains created in "the Image of G!d" and his humiliation has a limit.
Shabbat Shalom to all,
Pinchas, Tzippie and Family

יום רביעי, 14 באוגוסט 2013

Optional War and its consequences

“Scripture is referring to an optional war”

Pinchas Leiser



Rashi, following the Sages (Kiddushin 21b and Midrash Tanhuma), explains the juxtaposition of the passages of “the beautiful [captive] woman,” the “hated woman,” and the “rebellious son.”  He writes:

[and you desire her,] you may take [her] for yourself as a wife [Not that you are commanded to take this woman as a wife,] but the Torah [in permitting this marriage] is speaking only against the evil inclination [, which drives him to desire her]. For if the Holy One, blessed is He, would not permit her to him, he would take her illicitly. [The Torah teaches us, however, that] if he marries her, he will ultimately come to despise her, as it says after this, “If a man has [two wives-one beloved and the other despised]” (verse 15); [moreover] he will ultimately father through her a wayward and rebellious son (see verse 18). For this reason, these passages are juxtaposed. — [Tanhuma 1]
(Rashi Devarim 21:11, Judaica Press translation)

I think that the key phrase here is “the Torah is speaking only against the evil inclination.”  The Holy One blessed be He knows man’s soul and inclinations, and so He is willing not to have the Torah “prohibit” something that many people are likely in any case to do in time of war.  However, the juxtaposition of passages seems to teach us that all which follows (hate of the captive woman and the birth of the criminal son) result directly from the surrender to libidinous behavior that takes no account of any moral value.  After all, Rashi, following the Sages, interprets beautiful woman as “even a married woman.”  Scripture does not explicitly tell us how what the beautiful woman’s own position is towards all of this, how she feels about the enemy soldier who “took” her.  However, since the Torah goes on to tell us that she shall stay in your house, and weep for her father and her mother for a full month, we may assume that this might even be a case of rape.  The Torah also commands that if the man who took her in the storm of battle grows tired of her, he must release her and receive no compensation for his “loss” - You shall not keep her as a servant, because you have afflicted her.  It is an affliction for a woman to be taken on the field of battle.

I think that the range of examples covered by Rashi’s explanation of the juxtaposition of passages (as suggested by the Sages) can be extended on the basis of something Rashi writes in the beginning of the parasha, again following the Sages in Sifrei:

If you go out to war The verse here is referring to an optional war.

The word if [Hebrew: ki] indicates a situation that is dependent upon human decisions.  This is not an obligatory war, but rather one initiated by the nation’s leadership.

RaMBaM offers concise definitions of obligatory and optional wars:

At first the king may only fight obligatory wars.  Which wars are obligatory?  The war against the Seven Nations, the war against Amalek, and the defense of Israel against an enemy that has come upon them.  Afterwards he may fight optional wars; these are the wars he fights against other nations in order to expand Israel’s borders and to increase his greatness and fame.
(Hilkhot Melakhim 5:1)

The literal war against Amalek (rather than the eternal and symbolic war against absolute evil) and the war against the Seven Nations are merely of historical interest (“their memory is lost”).  The only war that can be called an “obligatory war” today is one fought in “the defense of Israel against an enemy that has come upon them,” i.e., a unavoidable war intended to protect the nation from attack by an enemy that threatens its existence.  All other wars are “optional wars.”

A halakhah found in Mishnah Sanhedrin 1:5 states:

An optional war is only waged with the permission of the Court of Seventy-One [judges].

That is to say: the highest judicial authority must oversee the political leadership’s decision to fight an “optional war,” and they must not be dragged into such a war by emotionalism and impulsivity.

The very term reshut - “optional” may require study and clarification.  Certainly the Torah does not relate positively to the taking of the “beautiful woman,” and the explication cited by Rashi makes this unambiguous.  The word “optional” often refers to situations that are not prohibited by the Torah but which are also not viewed as positive or desirable by the Torah.

The Mishnah and Gemara in tractate Makkot (chapter 2) deal with the case of a blood avenger who “murdered” an accidental killer who had left the city of refuge.  The halakhah adopts R. Akiva’s view, which states: the blood avenger has reshut [the option of killing the accidental killer].  In his Commentary on the Mishnah and in the Mishneh Torah, RaMBaM explains that this refers to a situation in which the accidental killer deliberately left the city of refuge.  The Torah uses the term murdered [ratzah]: and the blood-avenger murdered the murderer. True, the avenger will not stand trial for this murder, but his act is still referred to as a murder.

Along these lines, HaRAYaH Kook ztz”l sees a kind of “hidden rebuke” in the Torah’s formulation regarding the eating of meat: for it is your soul’s desire to eat meat.

A similar idea is expressed by R. Yohanan’s famous dictum regarding the reason for Jerusalem’s destruction:

R. Yohanan said: Jerusalem was destroyed only because they judged there according to the laws of the Torah.  Should they then have ruled arbitrarily?!  Rather say: They based their judgments upon the laws of the Torah and did not go beyond the letter of the law.
(Bava Metzia 30b)

The blanket command, and you shall do the right and the good, does not relate to specific halakhic categories.  I think that all the examples brought have something clear to say about the spiritual and moral plane of meta-halakhah, which stands beyond the concepts “permitted” and “prohibited.”  The category of reshut is not identical with the desirable and the moral, the straight and good in the eyes of God and man.  Rather, it refers to a certain region of human and social behaviors that are not prohibited by the Torah in a formal, halakhic, sense.

The Torah may be trying to relay to us an important message through the existence of the zone of reshut.  The Torah restricts human behavior with formal and external limits; the “four cubits o the halakhah” represent a legal-social framework that makes the minimal demands required of a Jew.  However, these demands do not command the good and the straight, the worthy, the moral, and the spiritually exalted.

Everything connected to this realm of “beyond the letter o the law” and “saintly virtue” is given over to the prerogative of human individuals and societies

I think that we can extend the message arising from Rashi and the Sages’ explication of the juxtaposition of passages in terms of “the Torah is speaking only against the evil inclination” to the very beginning of our parasha. 

The national leadership is apt to mobilize the people for an “optional war” in order, as the RaMBaM says, “to expand Israel’s borders and to increase his greatness and fame.”  The motivation for war may be politico-territorial or connected to considerations of personal prestige.  If such a decision is not ratified by an independent judicial authority (the Sanhedrin of Seventy-One) there is a great danger of wars motivated by the universal human drive for conquest.

The Torah spells out for us what may happen when people choose to wage a war which, while not “prohibited” – in as much as “the Torah is speaking only against the evil inclination.”  That scenario teaches us that every individual, every society, every nation and every state is granted the freedom to choose between surrender to the drive for conquest and moral behavior requiring self-control and moderation.

The Torah also teaches us that each choice made by an individual or a society influences their respective characters.  “Our Father Who is in Heaven, bless the State of Israel…send Your light and truth to its leaders, ministers, and advisors, and help them with Your good counsel.”


יום שישי, 9 באוגוסט 2013

דרושים: מנהיגים אחראים

לבני משפחתנו, חברותינו וחברינו היקרים,
פרשת "שופטים" שנקרא מחר מתחילה בציווי להקים מערכת משפט וגוף אחראי על אכיפת החוק (שוטרים) ומסתיימת בפרשת "עגלה ערופה". מסופר בפרשה אחרונה זו על מציאת גופה לא מזוהה של אדם שכנראה נרצח ולא נמצא הרוצח. במקרה זה על זקני העדה - ואולי גם השופטים הם חלק מזקני העדה - לקיים טכס ציבורי בו הם לוקחים על עצמם אחריות עקיפה על הרצח ושואלים עצמם שאלות נוקבות: האם דאגנו להרוג? האם סיפקנו לו אוכל, שמירה? האם דאגנו לרוצח? האם אכפנו את החוק? האם יצרנו תנאים בהם לא יהיו רוצחים בחברתנו? האם יש כיסוי למשפט "ידינו לא שפכו את הדם הזה"? דומני שתחילת הפרשה "מתכתבת" עם סיומה; האליטה אינה יושבת במגדל השן, אלא אחראית על מעשיה ומחדליה ועליה לבדוק עצמה בשקיפות מלאה. נדמה שלי שאין צורך לתת דוגמאות אקטואליות...
שבת שלום וחודש אלול של התחדשות יוצרת
פנחס, ציפי ומשפחתם



Dear Family and Friends,
Apparently there is a connection between the beginning and the end of the Torah-section we'll read tomorrow; establishing a system of Justice, by appointing judges isn't enough. People who have the power to judge and take important decisions need to be self-reflective and assume responsibility - even indirect responsibility - on their actions.
I guess there is no need for examples...
Shabbat Shalom and Hodesh Tov to all
Pinchas, Tzippie and Family

יום שישי, 2 באוגוסט 2013

ראייה אמפתית ומוסרית

לבני משפחתנו, חברותינו וחברינו היקרים,
בפרשת "ראה:" שנקרא מחר, המתחילה בבחירה הניתנת לנו בין "ברכה" ל"קללה", מופיעות לא מעט מצוות הבאות להגן על הגר, היותום והאלמנה, על החלש בחברה. בפרשתנו ובמקומות רבים, אומרת לנו התורה: וזכרת כי עבד היית במצרים".
לעתים, לאנשים או לעם שסבלו משיעבוד יש נטיה לנכס לעצמם את הבלעדיות על הסבל וקשה להם להיות אמפתיים עם סבלם של אחרים, לכן מזכירה לנו התורה איך להתבונן בעצמנו ובאחרים, כדי שנאמץ עמדה מוסרית כלפי סבלם של אחרים.
שבת שלום
פנחס, ציפי ומשפחתם 





Dear Family and Friends,
Among the Laws mentioned in the Torah-section we'll read tomorrow, there are many laws related to the poor,  the widow,  the orphan and the stranger and very often, when the Torah deals with the Just and Moral attitude towards the underprivileged members of society, we read: "You should remember that you have been slaves in Egypt".
Maybe sometimes people who have suffered, have the tendency to "monopolize" suffering and to be empathetic towards other people's suffering; therefore we are reminded of the proper moral attitude towards the underprivileged.
Shabbat Shalom to all,
Pinchas, Tzippie and Family


יום חמישי, 1 באוגוסט 2013

“AND SHOW COMPASSION TO YOU”

Pinchas Leiser


The context is which these words appear (Devarim 13:18) is – at first blush – odd and unanticipated.  Only a few passages earlier, the Torah charges us to treat the inhabitants of the ir hanidachat (a condemned city) with the full severity of the law: “Strike down, strike down the settlers of that town with the edge of the sword, consign it to destruction, it and all that is in it, and its animals, with the edge of the word..” Regarding this, the poet would question “They say there is mercy in the world – where is mercy here?”

Many commentators, beginning with Chazal, dealt with this difficult issue of collective punishment. In the mishna we find  a marked tendency to limit possibilities of practical application of the law of ir nidachat -- “A Condemned City”. {A similar  inclination may be found regarding a ben sorer u’more -- “A Rebellious Son”).  The Mishna in Sanhedrin (10:4) states: “The inhabitants of a condemned city have no portion in the World to Come, as is written, ‘Men, base men, have gone out from among you and have subverted  the settlers of their town . . .”  They are not to be killed until they have been subverted from that city and from that tribe, and until the majority have been subverted and until they have been subverted by males.  If women and/or minors were subverted, or if only a minority was subverted, or they subverted settlers from outside the town – all these are considered individuals [who have sinned]. And there must have been two witnesses who forewarned each of the sinners. In this respect, individual are punished more severely than communities, for  individual sinners are executed by stoning [the harshest form of court-imposed execution] – and therefore their property is spared. Communities are punished by the sword, and therefore their property is destroyed.”

An additional  tendency towards limitation of possibilities of application is to be found in the Tosefta (Sanhedrin 14:1)
“Minors of a condemned town who were subverted with the rest are not to be executed”;  Rabbi Eliezer says, “They are to be executed.” Rabbi Akiva said, “What is the practical application of the text ‘And show compassion to you, having compassion on you and making you many’ ? If to have mercy for the adults, it is already stated ‘Strike down, strike down’; if to have pity upon their livestock, it is already stated ‘and its animals with the edge of the sword”. What then, is the application of ‘and show compassion to you”?  It refers to the minors in it.
Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even adults are not executed, unless there are witnesses and forewarning. What is the practical application of  ‘And show compassion to you etc.’?
Lest the Bet Din say, ‘If we make this an ir nidachat, a condemned city, tomorrow their brothers and relatives will conspire in hatred against us,’  says the Omnipresent: ‘I will show compassion to you, and I will fill their hearts with love, that they say ‘We harbor no ill feelings against you, your verdict was just.”

            Rabbi Akiva, peerless interpreter, discerned in “And show compassion to you” a practical Halakhic order not to punish minors. But Rabbi Eliezer does not recognize any possibility of punishment unless it has been preceded by a valid judicial process (witnesses and forewarning).  At the same time, he read the phrase “And show compassion to you” as a promise that the execution of true justice will not result in social enmity, for all will understand that that what was done was necessary. Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer’s words can be read as condition and criterion, and not just as promise; only post facto can one be certain whether the punishment, brutal in itself, was justified; if the brothers and relatives of those executed in the ir hanidachat are able to say  “‘We harbor no ill feelings against you, your verdict was just” –  we will know that there has been an act justice accompanied by compassion.  If there is hatred in their hearts, then there was neither justice nor compassion; there is the danger that the hatred will develop and lead to vengeance, to a cycle of violence which may be difficult to break.
           
Sapient Chazal, in line with the hallowed traditions of the Oral Law, knew how to discern between principle and practical application. They well understood that “Inhabitants of an ir hanidachat have no share in the world to come”, that they have no right to exist in the world –they knew that everything said regarding them in the Written Torah is declarative truth, similar to “eye for an eye”, which comes to point out the severity of the act; but in practical application extreme caution must be exercised, taking into consideration a totality  of complex factors.

            Commentators of later times relate to the psychological damage which may be experienced by one who executes cruel punishment.  Rabbi Hayyim ibn Attar, 18th century author of “Ohr HaHayim,”   writes:
And show compassion to you” – The meaning of this passage is as follows: Inasmuch as He commanded that, in the ir hanidachat,’ they put the entire city to death, including the livestock, such action can produce a cruel nature in man’s heart, as the Ishmaelites tell us of a band of murderers subservient to the king, who murder with great passion; compassion has been uprooted from them, and they have become cruel. This characteristic can be rooted in those who annihilate the ir hanidachat. Therefore, they are promised that God will give them “rachamim” – compassion; even though they will have developed a cruel nature, their fountain of mercy will  shower them anew with the “power of compassion” to nullify the force of cruelty engendered by their actions.  “And show compassion for you” – Whenever man Possesses a cruel nature, so will God relate to him, for God has compassion only for the compassionate.  (Shabbat, 151b)

Rav Chayim ben Attar explains that cruel behavior can transform any person into a brutal person; only the ‘source of compassion’ can immunize one against cruelty. The author of the Ohr HaHayyim interprets “and show compassion to you” as a qualification of the promise; the promise is given only to the compassionate and not to the cruel. The gift of compassion is dependent upon the ‘source of compassion’ and upon the person himself.

The Netziv of Volozhin, one of the Torah giants of an earlier generation, elaborates upon the damage (‘evils’ in his terminology) which may affect the individual and society as a result of imposing the prescribed sentence upon the inhabitants of the ir hanidachat:

1st.       One who kills develops a cruel personality.  When an individual is executed by a proper court, the punishment is administered by a chosen appointee of the court; when an entire city is to be wiped out, of necessity we must train many people to kill and become cruel.
2nd.          Every inhabitant of the ir nidachat must have relatives elsewhere; hatred will increase in Israel.
3rd.           Israel’s population will decrease, creating “bald spots” on the population map. Scripture promised that if we execute the commandment without any personal benefit from spoils, God’s wrath will subside.

The Netziv, then, strictly adhering to the plain reading of the text, discerns a connection between the beginning of the passage “No part of the banned property may adhere to your hand” - and its continuation “so that God will turn back from his burning wrath, and He will show you compassion.”

The ethical message emerging from a careful reading of Chazal and later commentators is unambiguous.
On occasion, one is called upon to perform acts which are necessary, which serve noble causes. Cruel acts, involving bloodshed, are never noble; in any case, even when done for a noble and necessary cause, they have a deleterious effect upon the soul.  The only possibility for minimizing the damage is dependent upon God’s grace. Decreasing such damage depends upon the purity of intent and upon absence of any personal involvement and pleasure in performing the cruel acts.  This, too, is dependent upon God’s grace. The justice of a cruel, but necessary, act must be observed and measured by the result -- acceptance of the sentence by the relatives of the punished.

Ben Gurion labeled the cannon that he ordered to fire upon the Altelena “the holy cannon”.  He was wrong.  There are no ‘holy cannons.’

King David, sweet singer of Israel, servant of God, was not allowed to erect the temple:   
But the word of the Lord came to me, saying: You have shed blood abundantly, and have made great wars; you shall not build a house unto My name, because you have shed much blood upon the earth in My name.” (Chronicles I, 22:8)

War and bloodshed are often unnecessary and must be prevented. Occasionally there are situations of ‘ayn berayra’ – ‘no alternative’ – and we must fight, kill, and be killed. It is essential to differentiate between the two situations. In any case, bloodshed and the building of the temple are not compatible; bloodshed makes the Land tamei (impure), drives away the Shekhina, and causes spiritual and psychological damage.


Today, there seems to be a dangerous tendency to forget this simple moral truth. Therefore, we must remember, remind, and repeat – there are unnecessary wars, and there are wars which are ‘necessary evils’  - - there are no holy wars.