SANHEDRIN ADJACENT TO THE ALTAR
Pinchas Leiser
Bible commentators, beginning with Chazal, frequently
tended to refer to “juxtaposition of parshiot”, seeking significance in
the adjacency of Torah parshiyot. Well-known is the question (which has
become proverbial) “What is Shmitta doing near Mt. Sinai?” Rashi, commenting on the beginning of our parasha,
asks, as per the Mechilta: “And
why was the parasha of adjudication (dinim) placed next to the
laws pertaining to the alter [found at the end of Parashat Yitro]” Rashi’s answer: “To inform you that you
should place the Sanhedrin near the altar [Alternate reading “near the
Temple”].”
One can, of course, relate literally to this
drasha quoted by Rashi, seeing it as concrete instruction to place the
Sanhedrin in the Office of Hewn Stone. But even this topographical explication,
which interprets textual juxtaposition into geographical proximity, invites us
to investigate the significance of this proximity, in the sense of “Expound,
and reap reward.”
The Mechilta - apparently the source for
Rashi’s midrashic interpretation - brings additional support for the placement
of the Sanhedrin near the altar:
“That your nakedness may not be
exposed upon it – These are the rules that you shall set before them”. From
this we learn that the Sanhedrin is found alongside the altar. Even though
there exists no proof for this, there is an allusion to it, as is written: “And
Yoav fled and held on to the corners of the altar” (I Kings, 28).
This midrash ostensibly relates to the
geographical proximity of the place where Yoav ben Tsruya was judged (“the
Sanhedrin”) to the place to which he fled for safety. If, however, we relate to the Biblical
context and to additional Talmudic contexts, we can discern an addition plane
connecting the story of Yoav to our parasha.
In one of the opening passages of our parasha
(21:14), we read: When a man schemes
against another and kills him treacherously, you shall take him from My very
altar to be put to death.”
Chazal and other commentators on the Bible
noted the connection between the Biblical law and the story of Yoav; they found
in it the Halakhic justification for the slaying of Yoav despite the fact
that he held on to the corners of the altar. Similarly they derived from
this tie that a priest who murdered and desires to participate in the Temple
service, is prevented from approaching the altar; he is put to death. The altar
cannot protect one who has intentionally murdered.
This exegetical approach, too, is anchored in
Shemot 20:21 (also at the end of Yitro):
“If you make for Me an altar of
stones, do not build it of hewn stones; for by wielding your sword upon them
you have profaned them”.
The Tanchuma expounds: “for by wielding
your sword upon them you have profaned them’ – From this our rabbis
derived: The altar was created to prolong man’s life, iron was created to
shorten his life; it is not right that that which shortens be raised against
that which lengthens.”
The altar, then, cannot tolerate bloodshed
and cannot serve as protection against punishment for murder.
Rabbi Shimshon Rafael Hirsch, commenting on
the first passage of our parasha, elaborates upon Rashi’s midrashic commentary:
“And these” –
Immediately preceding, in the construction of the altar, the symbolic
expression of the fundamental basic principle was given, viz., that our whole
relationship to God is to be taken as one through which justice and humanness
for building up human society and morality and decency for the work of each
individual on himself, are to be gained and formed, on a firm unshatterable
basis. To that principle, the ‘vav’ (‘and’) adds the Mishpatim, the
legal laws by which the building up of Jewish society on the basis of justice
and humanness is first of all ordered. “Cherev”
– the ‘sword’, force and harshness are thereby to be banned from the Jewish
State, only then can they be worthy to erect an altar to God in their midst.
That is why these Mishpatim come before the building of the Mishkan.” (Translated
from the original by Isaac Levy).
Rabbi Hirsch, then, sees in the establishment
of a just and ethical society, sans force and brutality, an essential
stage which must precede the erection of the altar.
Additional study of the order in which laws
are arranged in Chapter 21, teaches us that this chapter deals with:
1.
The laws of the Hebrew
servant and maidservant (1-11).
2.
Various gradations of
violence, intentional and unintentional, and resulting physical damage (11-27).
3.
Damage to body and
possessions perpetrated by one’s property (28-37).
Ibn Ezra (in his short commentary on
Shemot) was mindful of this order:
“The main lesson is that man should not employ
violence, coercing one less capable than himself. It [Scripture] begins
with coercion affecting the body, i.e., enslaving a servant; following this it
mentions the maidservant . . .”
This parasha regarding the Hebrew servant
which opens the chapter and the order of
“mishpatim” provides the ethical
foundation for a just and moral society.
We cannot divorce the concept of the “eved
Ivri”, the Hebrew servant, from its historical context, a period in which
slavery was accepted; we cannot evaluate the phenomenon with the criteria of
modern times. But, even so, Chazal look upon the desire of the servant to
remain indentured to his master after six years with a disapproving eye, as is
evidenced by different midrashim (“For the Children of Israel are servants unto
Me’ – but not servants unto servants.”)
In other words, Chazal already understood
that the Torah itself does not approve of the phenomenon of servitude. The
wording “should you purchase a Hebrew servant” and other
passages similarly worded (“Should you go out to wage war on your enemies .
. . and see among the captives a beautiful woman”; “Should a man have a wayward
and defiant son” and numerous other examples) does not describe an ideal
situation, but rather an existing reality, sometimes even an undesirable
reality. If we continue to expound the juxtaposition of passages and
parshiot, we can deduce that the Torah wanted to each us that a just society
must base itself upon freemen, upon servants of God, not upon “servants of
servants.” A situation in which the
servant is dependent upon the institution of slavery – or alternatively, in
which the master creates a situation of dependency and cannot free himself of
the situation in which he enslaves others – this is a debased and corrupt
social situation which gives rise to violence, murder, and disrespect for man’s
person and property. In such an environment, no wonder we find men having a
dispute injuring a pregnant woman (21:20),
or people killing their fellows unwittingly or by design (21:12-13)
It may be that
the root of the evil is a double one, and transgression drags transgression:
a.
Failure to execute
faithfully the details of construction of the “altar” without raising a sword (20:22)
b.
The illusion that one
can erect an altar not in the framework of an enlightened, well-run society,
based on the rule of law and on basic rules of morality in interpersonal
relations.
It may be that in our times the rules of the eved
Ivri have few direct ramifications,
but the moral and ideological principles which we are able to deduce from the
proximity of the parshiot of the
alter and of mishpatim and the parasha of the Hebrew servant are
most important.
A society that strives for spirituality is
based first and foremost upon the absolute negation of subjugation of man by
man, upon absence of violence, upon rule of law, and upon respect for all men
created in the image of God.
אין תגובות:
הוסף רשומת תגובה